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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from an order issued in the Second Judicial 
District Court, Layton Department, Davis County, State of Utah, 
by the Honorable Alfred C. Van Wagenen denying Appellant's Motion 
to Suppress and Dismiss. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1996), as the appeal is 
from a district court in a criminal case not involving a 
conviction of a first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Officer Arbogast possessed reasonable 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity, i.e., an open 
container violation, prior to initiating a traffic stop of the 
defendant's vehicle. • 
2. Whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial 
hearing by the court. 
The standard of review in this case is as follows: "a trial 
court determination of whether a specific set of facts gives rise 
to reasonable suspicion is a determination of law and is 
reviewable nondeferentially for correctness." State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); accord State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 
450(Utah 1996) . 
However, as the Supreme Court stated in State v. Hodson, 907 
P.2d 1155 (Utah 1995), a "measure of discretion" to such 
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determinations must be given because the legal standard for 
reasonable suspicion "is highly fact dependent and the fact 
patterns are quite variable-." Id. at 1157, quoting Pena, 869 P.2d 
at 940. Therefore, this Court should review the decision of the 
trial court for correctness while affording "a measure of 
discretion to the trial court in its application of the 
correctness standard to a given set of facts." Chapman/ 921 P.2d 
at 450 (citing Pena, 869 P.2d at 939). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For the purpose of this brief the appellee agrees with and 
incorporates here by reference the appellant's statement of the 
case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about January 20, 1997, at approximately 3:50 p.m., 
Officer Bruce Arbogast was on routine patrol in the area of State 
Road 126 and 1900 North in Sunset, Davis County, Utah. See 
Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record at 32, 38. 
At that time, while facing north in the left turn lane and 
while waiting to turn west, Officer Arbogast glanced to the left 
at which time he observed the appellant (hereinafter "the 
defendant") drinking what he believed to be a beer, to wit: a 
Budweiser. Id. at 32, 52. 
Officer Arbogast was approximately six to seven feet from 
the defendant's car. Id. at 34. 
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In addition, Officer Arbogast testified at the suppression 
hearing that the defendant's car was traveling at a speed of 
between five and ten miles per hour. Id. 33. Moreover, he 
further testified that the defendant's car was in the process of 
slowing down for the traffic already stopped at the stop light 
that was beginning to start up again. Id. at 33, 38. 
Specifically, Officer Arbogast testified that he observed 
the defendant drinking from a dark colored bottle with a short 
bottle neck that had a red and white colored label or wrapper on 
it. ZsL- at 34-35, 42. 
Officer Arbogast also testified at tti>e suppression hearing 
that the fact that the bottle had a colored label or wrapper on 
it was significant to him because in his experience, most dark 
brown soda bottles or root beer bottles do not have labels or 
wrappers on them. Id. 43. Indeed, Officer Arbogast testified 
that in his experience in 90% of the time bottles with dark brown 
coloring and wrappers on them turn out to be alcoholic beverages. 
Id. 35. 
Also, at the time of the incident in question, Officer 
Arbogast had been an officer, whether it was in a reserve 
capacity, full-time capacity, or both, for almost 12 months. Id. 
at 37-38. 
Additionally, Officer Arbogast testified at the suppression 
hearing that he had investigated more than 10 cases where he had 
recovered alcoholic bottles similar to the bottle he observed in 
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the present case. Id. at 35. Most important, Officer Arbogast 
testified that in all of the cases he had investigated involving 
alcohol, he had never recovered a root beer bottle. Id. at 56. 
Finally, Officer Arbogast testified that if he had observed 
a child drinking from the brown bottle observed in the present 
case, his suspicions that it was a beer would have been 
dispelled. Id. at 56. 
Thus, based on his observation, coupled with his training 
and experience in investigating alcohol related offenses, Officer 
Arbogast activated his emergency lights on his patrol car, made a 
u-turn, and stopped the defendant's car. ;Id. at 35-36. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
THE TRAFFIC STOP IN THIS CASE WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BECAUSE OFFICER 
ARBOGAST POSSESSED REASONABLE ARTICULABLE 
SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, I.E., AN OPEN 
CONTAINER VIOLATION, PRIOR TO INITIATING A TRAFFIC 
STOP OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE 
Appellant argues that Officer Arbogast did possess 
reasonable articulable suspicion to justify his traffic stop of 
the defendant's car under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Because Appellant does not specifically 
challenge the search in this case under Article I Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution, Appellee will not engage in a separate 
state constitutional analysis. 
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THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR AN IMPARTIAL 
HEARING BY THE COURT BECAUSE THE COURT DID IN FACT 
ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL TO ASK ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS 
OF OFFICER ARBOGAST AFTER THE STATE HAD CONCLUDED 
ITS EXAMINATION OF THE OFFICER 
Appellant contends that the Honorable Alfred C. Van Wagenen 
was both attentive at the suppression hearing and equitable in 
allowing the Appellee to present his case. Indeed, the record 
unambiguously demonstrates that Judge Van Wagenen allowed the 
Appellee to continue questioning Officer Arbogast although the 
Appellee would have this Court believe otherwise. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Turning first to the question of reasonable suspicion, the 
State notes generally the applicable law. In Salt Lake City v. 
Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003 (Utah App. 1996), this Court reiterated the 
long standing principle that in order for an officer to legally 
i-
effect a temporary seizure, "the officer must have 'articulable 
suspicion' that the suspect has or is about to commit a crime. 
. ." IsL. at 1006; See also State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 
1996) (a police officer may detain and question an individual 
when the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal 
activity.) 
In the present case, the defendant states that the sole 
basis for Officer Arbogast's stop is "that he observed Appellant 
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take a drink from a brown colored bottle when he glimpsed at 
Appellant as Appellant was passing the officer's patrol car at an 
estimated speed of seven miles per hour, which would equate to a 
rate of ten feet per second." See Appellant's Brief at 7. 
However, these facts as set out by the defendant do not 
accurately tell the whole story. Officer Arbogast testified that 
he observed the defendant drinking from a dark colored bottle 
with a short bottle neck that had a red and white colored label 
or wrapper on it. Id. at 34-35, 42. 
In fact, Officer Arbogast testified that the label or 
wrapper was particularly significant to him because in his 
experience, he had never encountered dark brown soda bottles or 
root beer bottles with labels or wrappers on them. Id. 43. 
Furthermore, Officer Arbogast testified that based on his 
experience in 90% of the time bottles with dark brown coloring 
and wrappers on them turn out to be alcoholic beverages. Id. 35. 
Additionally, at the time of the incident in question, 
Officer Arbogast had been a law enforcement officer for almost 12 
months. Id. at 37-38. 
Also, Officer Arbogast testified at the suppression hearing 
that he had investigated more than 10 cases where he had 
recovered alcoholic bottles similar to the bottle he observed in 
the present case. Id. at 35. 
Most important, Officer Arbogast testified that in all of 
the cases he had investigated involving alcohol, he had never 
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recovered a root beer bottle. Id. at 56. 
Finally, Officer Arbogast testified that if he had observed 
a child drinking from the brown bottle observed in the present 
case, his suspicions that it was a beer would have been 
dispelled. Id. at 56. However, he did not observe a child. He 
observed the defendant, who is an adult.-
In the State's view, the foregoing observations, coupled 
with Officer Arbogast's experience, not only are specific and 
articulable as defined by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and 
its progeny, but also are sufficient to support a finding of 
reasonable suspicion under this Court's decision in Provo Citv 
Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437 (Utah App. 1993) . 
In Spotts, while on routine patrol, an officer observed the 
defendant in that case in his truck taking some "hits" from a 
small cigarette which appeared to her to be a "joint." However, 
the officer admitted at trial that she did not know whether a 
hand-rolled tobacco cigarette would burn in a way significantly 
different from a marijuana joint. Id. at 438-439. Also, there 
is no indication from the Court's opinion that the officer ever 
explained why she believed the hand-rolled joint, based on its 
shape and size, contained marijuana instead of tobacco. 
Rather, the statement of facts in the Court's opinion simply 
points out that the officer could see that the cigarette was 
smaller than a manufactured cigarette and that, in the officer's 
opinion, it had the distinctive shape of a joint. Id. 
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Thus, based on the factual circumstances present in that 
case, the defendant in Spotts argued on appeal, as does the 
defendant in the present case, that the officer did not observe 
any activity inconsistent with innocent behavior. Id. at 439. 
In fact, the defendant in Spotts specifically argued that his 
conduct was just as consistent with that of an individual smoking 
a hand-rolled tobacco cigarette. Id. at 440. 
However, this Court in Spotts stated unambiguously that 
"where a defendant's conduct is ^conceivably consistent with 
innocent . . . activity,' but is also ^strongly indicative' of 
criminal activity, we will not hesitate td conclude that 
reasonable suspicion exists. Id. quoting State v. Menke, 787 
P.2d 537, 541 (UtahApp. 1990). 
In the instant case, there is little, if any doubt, that 
this Court's decision in Spotts is both analogous and 
controlling. Indeed, the defendant applies by analogy the 
marijuana joint hypothetical in the last paragraph of his 
argument on reasonable suspicion to suggest the result advanced 
by the defendant in Spotts. However, the result the defendant 
suggests, i.e., that this Court find that Officer Arbogast did 
not have reasonable suspicion because the conduct of the 
defendant was just as easily innocent as it was criminal, is 
simply misplaced given this Court's holding in Spotts. 
Hence, based on the holding in 'Spotts, the State 
respectfully urges this Court to find that Officer Arbogast had 
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reasonable articulable suspicion to justify his traffic stop of 
the defendant's car. 
POINT II 
Turning finally to the question concerning the fairness and 
impartiality of the suppression hearing, and the attentiveness of 
Judge Van Wagenen, the State contends that the arguments advanced 
by the defendant are meritless. Indeed, although the defendant 
seeks to give this Court the impression that he was cut-off in 
the middle of his examination of the officer, such was not the 
case. 
In fact, a careful review of the transcript of the 
suppression hearing clearly indicates that while the State only 
asked questions totaling approximately seven (7) pages of hearing 
transcript, the defendant was allowed to ask questions totaling 
approximately 19.5 pages of hearing transcript. Moreover, even 
though the Court suggested to the defendant that he had asked 
enough questions, the Court nevertheless, allowed the defendant 
to continue to examine the officer. Indeed, in this regard the 
transcript of the suppression hearing bears this out as follows: 
MR. DI REDA: May I ask just one more question? I 
won't even stand up to do it, just one. 
FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DI REDA: 
Q Of all the cases you've investigated 
involving alcohol, how many cases would 
you say you've investigated where you've 
9 
discovered root beer bottles? 
A None. 
MR, DI REDA: That's all I have. 
MR. CARDON: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: No. You don't get one more. You've 
had enough. Haven't you really? 
MR. CARDON: I ought to follow that up. 
THE COURT: Oh. follow it up, then go ahead. 
FURTHER RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CARDON: 
Q At this point you'd only been an officer for 
six months, is that correct? 
A At the time of the stop? 
Q Right. 
A As a full time officer, yes. 
Q And in fact as of right now you've got three 
times the amount of time in that you had 
then, is that correct? 
A It is. 
MR. CARDON: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Alright you may step down. Mr. 
Cardon, I assume, is this all the 
evidence we're going to hear? 
MR. CARDON: Yes, it is, Your Honor. 
See transcript of suppression hearing at 56-57. 
The foregoing exchange unquestionably indicates that the 
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Court was both fair and impartial in allowing the defendant to 
examine Officer Arbogast. There is simply nothing in the record 
or anywhere else to suggest otherwise. 
As an additional matter, to the extent that the defendant 
claims the Court was inattentive because Judge Van Wagenen 
thought that Officer Arbogast's use of the term wrapper meant a 
"brown bag, the State admits that it was confused by the use of 
the term wrapper as well. 
The problem that existed during this portion of Officer 
Arbogast's testimony stems from the fact that Officer Arbogast 
used the term wrapper and label interchangeably. In the State's 
view, this confusion is easily understood. In fact, when the 
Court inquired further of Officer Arbogast as to what he was 
specifically referring, Judge Van Wagenen stated, "So are you 
talking label then," to whi.ch Officer Arbogast responded by 
stating, "Yes, I'm sorry the label on it." See Transcript at 46-
47. 
The foregoing excerpt from the hearing indicates that even 
the officer perceived the confusion he had created by using the 
terms wrapper and label synonymously. Indeed, that is why he 
apologized. 
Thus, for the above-stated facts and reasons, the State 
respectfully asks this Court to find that the hearing was both 
fair and impartial. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the facts, reasons, and case law stated above, the State 
respectfully asks this Court to affirm the decision of the trial 
Court in denying the defendant's motion to suppress. 
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